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Abstract
Part I discusses Russian and international statutory law. It briefly outlines the structure of
the government of the Russian Federation and discusses relevant articles of its Constitution. It
then illustrates the legislative trend in question by discussing select legislation passed and proposed during President Putin’s third term that seeks to restrict non-Russian influence in Russian
society. Part I closes with a discussion of Russia’s international human rights obligations, and
the international redress available to Russian nationals affected by the laws in question. Part II
considers the practical application of the laws discussed in Part I. This includes an examination
of potential procedural issues relating to the complaint process a Russian national would have to
navigate at one of the international human rights tribunals or treaty bodies founded under the conventions. Additionally, Part II briefly outlines international jurisprudence relevant to the prospect
of Russian nationals’ success before the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Based on the
interplay between the federal statutes in question and Russia’s international human rights obligations, this Note asserts in Part III that Russian nationals should file complaints to the UN Human
Rights Committee. The Note also advocates for a progressive change to Russia’s domestic civilpolitical environment. But in the absence of such a change, individuals affected by the legislation
in question can seek recourse through the Committee’s individual complaint mechanism. Those
petitioning would ideally include the heads of targeted civil society and human rights monitoring
and advocacy groups.
KEYWORDS: Russia, International Law, Human Rights, European Convention, ICCPR, Putin,
Committee, UN, Foreign Agent Law
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“Закон—что дышло, куда повернёшь—туда и вышло.”
(“The law is like a cart shaft—whichever way you turn it, that’s
the way it goes.”)
–Russian rhyming proverb

INTRODUCTION
Despite Russian civil advocates’ apparent preference to litigate
human rights violations at the European Court of Human of Rights,
the United Nations Human Rights Committee may provide a better
recourse mechanism to challenge a recent trend in Russian
legislation.1 This legislative trend centers on federal laws that directly
and indirectly restrict freedom of expression and association, and also
implicate individuals’ rights to privacy by identifying certain civil
1. A search of the European Court’s jurisprudence database for decisions with Russia as
a party produces 1,542 results, available at http://hudoc.ECHR.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/
search.aspx#{"languageisocode":["ENG"],"respondent":["RUS"],"documentcollectionid2":["G
RANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]}; a search of United Nations Human Rights Committee
Views at the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database that
include Russia as a party produces only forty-seven, available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=RUS&Lang=EN.
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society activists and advocates as agents of insidious non-Russian
influence on Russian society.2 This Note concludes that affected
Russian nationals should file complaints based on these laws at the
Human Rights Committee.
Russia is an important regional and international economic and
political player, and its recognition of the jurisdictions of multiple
international human rights tribunals is commendable.3 Its Constitution
provides for a multi-party democracy with separations of the
executive, judiciary, and legislature.4 It also enshrines the freedoms of
expression, association, and privacy.5
The legislative trend under discussion coincides with the third
term of President Vladimir V. Putin, which began in May 2012.6 It
codifies a general theme in contemporary Russian political rhetoric
that identifies amorphous non-Russian actors—colloquially and
sometimes explicitly understood to be Western governments and their
2. Federal'nyj Zakon N 121-ФЗ, “O vnesenii izmenenij v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty
Rossijskoj Federacii v chasti regulirovanija dejatel'nosti nekommercheskih organizacii,
vypolnjajushhih funkcii inostrannogo agenta” [Federal Law No. 121-FZ, “On changes to
individual legal acts of the Russian Federation in the regulation of activities of noncommercial organizations performing the functions of a “foreign agent”] (as amended June 4,
2014) [hereinafter Foreign Agent Law].
3. See, e.g., JEFFREY MANKOFF, RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE RETURN OF GREAT
POWER POLITICS, (2009); Paul Dibb, The Bear is Back, AM. INTEREST, Nov./Dec. 2006;
BOBO LO, PUTIN AND THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY (2003); THOMAS
AMBROSIO, CHALLENGING AMERICA’S GLOBAL PRE-EMINENCE: RUSSIA’S QUEST FOR
MULTIPOLARITY (2005).
4. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (Articles of the Russian Constitution
outlining multi-party democratic system with separation of branches of government).
5. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (Articles of the Russian Constitution
protecting expression, association, and privacy).
6. Ellen Barry & Sophia Kishkovsky, Putin Takes Helm as Police Punish Moscow
Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
05/08/world/europe/vladimir-putin-returns-to-presidency-in-russia.html (noting President
Putin’s return for a third term); Vladimir Putin Inaugurated as Russian President, BBC NEWS,
May 7, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17979914 (reporting on
President Putin’s return following “controversial” March 2012 elections). A former spy
alleged to have close ties with Russian and Ukrainian organized crime syndicates, Mr. Putin
held various positions in the Saint Petersburg municipal government and the federal
government in the 1990s. In 1999, he was appointed Prime Minister of Russia under thenPresident Boris Yeltsin, and later that year, Acting President upon Yeltsin’s resignation. In
March 2000 he was elected President of the Russian Federation, a post he held for two terms,
ending in 2008. He began a new four-year term that year as Prime Minister in the government
of then-President Dmitry Medvedev, announced his return to the executive office in late 2011,
then returned to that office the following Spring. Russia’s Constitution was amended shortly
before Mr. Putin’s 2012 return to the executive to extend the duration of presidential terms to
six years from four years.
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agents—as the sources of Russia’s domestic woes.7 One bill
submitted to Russia’s parliament, which is discussed below, refers
concretely to US and European sanctions against Russian nationals as
the impetus for its introduction.8 The Foreign Agent Law, which is
the most well-known statute under examination, requires some civil
society groups receiving funding from outside Russia to register and
advertise their status as “foreign agents.”9
These laws create a legal means for the Kremlin to discourage
Russians from exercising constitutionally granted freedoms of
association and expression when that exercise is alleged to be
political. They also implicate privacy and reputational rights and pose
physical safety concerns for Russians who are forced to declare—
accurately or not—that they are working in the interests of nonRussian powers.10 It is for these reasons that the relevant statutes
facially contravene relevant sections of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”) and the European
Convention on Human Rights.11

7. See generally Bol'shaja press-konferencija Vladimira Putina [Great Press Conference
of Vladimir Putin] (transcript) (Dec. 18, 2014), http://kremlin.ru/news/47250 (asserting that
opposition-minded activists constitute a “fifth column” in Russian society whose activities are
“dictated by the interests of a foreign government”); see also Obrashhenie Prezidenta
Rossijskoj Federacii [Message from the President of the Russian Federation] (transcript),
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20603 (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (asserting
Western powers’ bid to stir up “national traitors” in Russia by issuing sanctions in connection
with the reincorporation of Crimea); and David Remnick, Watching the Eclipse, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 11, 2014), (interview with former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul,
describing President Putin as “on the offensive against any sign of foreign interference”).
8. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
9. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2.
10. To be clear, these activists and advocates are primarily in the human rights field, and
would maintain that their work is in the service of the Russian people.
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 17.1 (“No one shall be subjected . . . to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation”); id. art. 19.2 (“Everyone shall have the right to
. . . impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . either orally, in writing or in print”); id. art.
22.1 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others”). Council of
Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11, 14, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, ETS No. 5, Section I Rights and Freedoms, art. 10 (Freedom of expression) and
art. 11 (Freedom of assembly and association); Council of Europe Treaty Office, Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Status as of 12/19/2014,
available
at
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=19/12/2014&CL=ENG (showing Russian ratification
of the Convention May 5, 1998 and its entry into force for Russia the same day) (last accessed
March 10, 2015, 4:28 PM).
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Part I discusses Russian and international statutory law. It briefly
outlines the structure of the government of the Russian Federation and
discusses relevant articles of its Constitution. It then illustrates the
legislative trend in question by discussing select legislation passed
and proposed during President Putin’s third term that seeks to restrict
non-Russian influence in Russian society. Part I closes with a
discussion of Russia’s international human rights obligations, and the
international redress available to Russian nationals affected by the
laws in question.
Part II considers the practical application of the laws discussed
in Part I. This includes an examination of potential procedural issues
relating to the complaint process a Russian national would have to
navigate at one of the international human rights tribunals or treaty
bodies founded under the conventions. Additionally, Part II briefly
outlines international jurisprudence relevant to the prospect of
Russian nationals’ success before the United Nations Human Rights
Committee.
Based on the interplay between the federal statutes in question
and Russia’s international human rights obligations, this Note asserts
in Part III that Russian nationals should file complaints to the UN
Human Rights Committee. The Note also advocates for a progressive
change to Russia’s domestic civil-political environment. But in the
absence of such a change, individuals affected by the legislation in
question can seek recourse through the Committee’s individual
complaint mechanism. Those petitioning would ideally include the
heads of targeted civil society and human rights monitoring and
advocacy groups.
I. RUSSIAN AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BACKGROUND
The following Section offers background on the Russian and
international laws that frame subsequent discussions and international
legal evaluations of this recent legislative trend. It begins by
discussing the structure of the Russian government, as set forth by its
Constitution, and continues with discussions of notable Russian
federal laws. These include rights-protection provisions of the
Russian Constitution and various laws and bills illustrating the anti“foreign influence” trend in President Putin’s third term. Part I then
outlines Russia’s international human rights obligations, including
redress mechanisms contained within the notable treaties.
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A. The Russian Federal Structure
The Russian Federation is similar, at least on paper, to Western
governments. The 1993 Russian Constitution and related
constitutional law establish a federative republic with the President as
head of state and the Prime Minister as head of government.12 The
Russian Federation is set up as a multi-party democracy with a
tripartite federal apparatus similar to that of the United States.13 The
bicameral Federal Assembly of Russia, which comprises the 450-seat
State Duma and the 170-seat Federation Council, adopts federal law,
declares war, approves treaties, exercises spending power, and may
impeach the President.14 The President is the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, shapes Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, and
enjoys broad authority in appointing various federal officers and
representatives, including but not limited to a cabinet.15 Russia’s
Constitutional Court, whose judges are appointed by the Federation
Council from a selection of presidential nominees, interprets and

12. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 1.1
(Russ.) (“Russia is a democratic federative constitutional state with a republican form of
government” ) (This and all subsequent translations from Russian to English are by the author,
unless otherwise noted); Id. at art. 80.1 (“The President of the Russian Federation shall be the
Head of State”); Federal’nyj konstitucionnyj zakon ot 17.12.1997 “O pravitel’stve Rossijskoj
Federacii” (red. ot 12.03.2014) [Federal Constitutional law of 12.17.1997 “On the leadership
of the Russian Federation” (amended as of 03.12.2014)] art. 24 (“The Prime Minister of
Russia heads the government of the Russian Federation[.]”).
13. KONST. RF, supra note 12, art. 13.3 (“Political diversity and the multi-party system
shall be recognized”); id. art. 10 (“The bodies of legislative, executive, and judicial authority
shall be independent.”).
14. Id. art. 108.2 (“A federal constitutional law shall be considered to have been adopted
if it is approved by a majority of not less than three quarters of the total number of members of
the Federation Council and not less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the State
Duma”); id. art. 106.f (federal laws on “war and peace” are adopted by the State Duma and are
required to be examined by the Federation Council); id. art. 106.d (federal laws on “ratification
and denunciation of international treaties of the Russian Federation” are adopted by the State
Duma and required to be examined by the Federation Council); id. art. 106.a (federal laws on
the federal budget are adopted by the State Duma and required to be examined by the
Federation Council); id. art. 102.1.f (“impeachment of the President of the Russian Federation”
is one object of the jurisdiction of the Federation Council).
15. Id. art. 87.1 (“The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Supreme
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”); id. art. 80.3 (“The
President of the Russian Federation shall, in accordance to the Constitution of the Russian
Federation and federal laws, determine the basic objectives of the internal and foreign policy
of the State”); id. art. 83 (outlining President’s power to appoint various government posts and
make other domestic and foreign policy determinations).
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reviews statutes and may overturn those it deems unconstitutional.16
Russia’s Constitution creates a judiciary separate from the executive
branch.17
Russians elect their president by popular vote every six years
with the possibility of reelection for a second consecutive term.18 The
number of non-consecutive terms an elected Russian President may
serve is constructively unlimited.19 Government ministries comprise
the Prime Minister and his deputies, ministers, and others.20 All of
these positions are presidentially appointed with the recommendation
of the Prime Minister.21
B. Russian Federal Legislation
1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation
The Constitution of the Russian Federation is the supreme law of
the land.22 Its current iteration was passed in 1993 following the

16. Id. art. 128.1 (“Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation . . .
shall be appointed by the Federation Council upon nomination by the President of the Russian
Federation”); id. art. 125.2.a (The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, at the
request of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma,
one fifth of the members of the Federation Council or of the deputies of the State Duma, the
Government of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and
bodies of legislative and executive power of constituent entities of the Russian Federation,
shall, inter alia, “decide cases on conformity to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of .
. . federal laws, normative acts of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation
Council, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation”).
17. Id. art. 10 (inter alia, “Bodies of legislative, executive and judicial authority shall be
independent”).
18. Id. art. 81 (“1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for six years
by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage by secret
ballot. . . 3. One and the same individual may not hold the office of President of the Russian
Federation for more than two consecutive terms.”).
19. See, e.g., Bol'shaja press-konferencija, supra note 7, (including questions from elite
journalists regarding President Putin’s plans to remain in office); Chetvertyj srok Putina
[Putin’s Fourth Term], MOSKOVSKIJ KOMSOMOLEC, (Mar. 9, 2015) http://www.mk.ru/
politics/2015/03/09/chetvertyy-srok-putina.html (quoting Russian political scientists
speculating on why, halfway through President Putin's third term, he has been “silent” on, for
example, “naming” a successor). Putin perennially fields questions about his plans to run in the
next cycle, and media and others speculate that he could remain in power for decades to come.
20. KONST. RF, supra note 12, art. 83.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 15 (“The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have supreme legal
force … and other legal acts, which are adopted in the Russian Federation, must not contradict
the Constitution[.]”).
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dissolution of the Soviet Union.23 Article 29 of the Russian
Constitution enshrines freedom of expression, with some minor
limitations.24 Freedom of association is protected under Article 30.25
Meanwhile, Article 23 protects Russian nationals from State
interference with their reputation.26 The text of all provisions
generally mirrors that of the relevant sections of the ICCPR.27
2. The Foreign Agent Law
On July 13, 2012, two months into President Putin’s third term,
Russia’s legislature passed the Foreign Agent Law.28 It went into
effect four months later.29 Among other features, it outlines the
establishment and maintenance of a federal register of civil society
groups deemed “foreign agents” due to the fact that they receive
23. Russia has had Constitutions dating back to the Imperial period. See Osnovnye
gosudarstvennye zakony, utverzhdennye ukazom Nikolaja II, 1906 g., Aprelja 23 [Basic
Governing Laws, ordered by decree of Nicholas II, Apr. 23, 1906] (CONST.) (Rus. Emp.),
available at http://www.rusconstitution.ru/library/constitution/articles/9269; Osnovnoj zakon
(Konstitucija) Rossijskoj Sovetskoj Federativnoj Socialisticheskoj Respubliki, 10 ijulja 1918
g. [Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, July 10, 1918]
(CONST.) (Rus. Sov. Soc. Rep.) available in facsimile at http://www.1000dokumente.de/
index.html/index.html?c=dokument_ru&dokument=0005_ver&object=facsimile&l=ru.
24. KONST. RF, supra note 12, art. 29.
(“1. Freedom of thought and speech is guaranteed to all.
2. Propaganda or agitation arousing social, racial, national or religious hatred and
hostility are prohibited. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy
are prohibited . . . .
5. The freedom of mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited.”).
25. Id. at art. 30 (“Everyone shall have the right of association[.] The freedom of activity
of public associations shall be guaranteed.”).
26. Id. at art. 23.1 (“Everyone shall have the right to the inviolability of his (her) private
life, personal and family privacy, and protection of his (her) honour and good name.”).
27. Compare KONST. RF, supra note 12, art. 29, and id. art. 30, with UN General
Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (December
16, 1966), art. 18 [hereinafter ICCPR or the Covenant]:
“1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” and
KONST. RF, supra note 12, art. 19.
“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.”
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”
Also compare KONST. RF, supra note 12, art. 23.1, with ICCPR, art. 17: “1. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
28. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 9. Russian human rights NGOs are nearly universally
funded by non-Russian sources.
29. Id.
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material support from sources outside the Russian Federation, or that
there are allegations stating as much.30 Russia’s Presidential Council
on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights has characterized the
Foreign Agent Law as “totally redundant and legally meaningless.”31
In language and spirit, the Foreign Agent Law mirrors a 1938
US statute called the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires
that organizations alleged to be engaged in political activities that
further the interests of non-US governments register with the
Attorney General.32 However, the Russian statute—which is actually
a set of twenty-seven amendments to or nullifications of provisions of
five existing laws—is considerably more detailed than its two-page
American inspiration.33 A “non-commercial organization”—as nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are called in Russia—satisfies
the legal requirements of the Foreign Agent Law if it: (1) operates in
Russia; (2) receives money or other material support from nonRussian government agencies, international and other non-Russian
organizations, non-Russian citizens, stateless persons, or even
Russian legal persons that receive such support; and (3) engages in

30. Id. arts. 1(1), 1(2)(b), 2(3)(a-b), 2(5)(k), 3(2).
31. Sovet pri Prezidente Rossijskoj Federacii po razvitiju grazhdanskogo obshhestva i
pravam cheloveka, Zakljuchenie na proekt Federal'nogo zakona N109968-6 [Council to the
President of the Russian Federation on Civil Society and Human Rights, Conclusions on the
Project
of
Federal
Law
N109968-6]
http://old.president-sovet.ru/upload/files/
zaklyuchenie_soveta_109968-6.php?sphrase_id=12513 (last visited Mar. 10, 2015)
(Concluding that the law is “meaningless”); Polina Matveeva, Inostrannye agenty poamerikanski [Foreign Agents, American Style], GAZETA.RU (Jan. 16, 2014, 8:30 PM),
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/01/16_a_5852381.shtml (describing President Putin’s
suggestion to create a Russian Foreign Agent Law as an analogue to the American statute, and
quoting a member of the Council who refers to the Russian law as “incomprehensible” and to
its basis as “untruth”).
32. Compare Registration of Foreign Propagandists, 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1938) (“‘political
activities’ means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person
intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States
. . . with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the
United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a
government of a foreign country or a foreign political party”), with Foreign Agent Law, supra
note 2, at art. 2.2, ¶ 2 (“A noncommercial organization . . . shall be deemed engaging in
political activity carried out in the territory of the Russian Federation if, irrespective of the
goals and objectives stated in its founding documents, it takes part (including through
financing) in the organization and conduct of political actions aimed at influence over the
decision-making by state bodies indented for change of state policy pursued by [said bodies],
as well as in the shaping of public opinion for the aforementioned purposes”).
33. The US statute is still in effect.
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“political activities” on Russian territory.34 The UN Human Rights
Committee, which reviews State Party compliance with the ICCPR in
addition to its role as a tribunal, called on Russia in March 2015 to
either repeal the law or revise it in order to remove the term “foreign
agent” entirely and to define political activity.35
i. Reporting requirements
The Foreign Agent Law creates various reporting standards for
organizations falling within the definition of the statute; for example,
an organization’s financial statements are subject to random audit.36
The Russian “foreign agent” NGO must also report to the Ministry of
Justice on its activities.37 It must provide to the Ministry of Justice an
accounting of its personnel, including the members and structure of
any governing bodies, as well as documents illustrating current and
future budget allocations.38 These requirements are in addition to an
auditor’s report.39 Such submissions were originally required
annually, but summer 2014 amendments to the law increased the
regularity of reporting to every six months.40
“Foreign agent” organizations are also required to advertise their
status on the front page of their website and on all official
publications.41 The requirements have changed several times, but in
34. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2, at art. 2.2 (explaining that political activities
include bids to “influence . . . decision-making by state bodies intended for the change of state
policy pursued by them, as well as the shaping of public opinion for the aforementioned
purposes,” but not including, inter alia, sport, “social support,” “promotion of healthy living,”
and other goals). This section excepts open joint-stock companies and their subsidiaries partowned by the Kremlin.
35. United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the seventh
periodic report of the Russian Federation (Advance Unedited Version) (Mar. 2015), ¶ 22
(“The State party should repeal or revise the legislation requiring non-commercial
organizations that receive foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’ with a view to
bringing it in line with the State party’s obligations under the Covenant, and take into account
the opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
in this regard. It should, at the very least: (a) drop the term ‘foreign agent’ from the law; (b)
clarify the broad definition of ‘political activities’[.]”).
36. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2, art. 2.5.a (subjecting annual accounting statements
of “foreign agent” NGOs, including departmental finance reports, to statutory audit).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2, art. 2.5.b (requiring biannual reporting on
accounting and personnel).
41. Id. art. 2.4 (requiring that “foreign agent” organizations state on their website that any
information they provide is done so by such an organization).
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June 2013 Russia’s Ministry of Justice was granted the authority to
add organizations to the Foreign Agent Register of its own accord,
without being required to notify the organizations in question.42
ii. Liability
The creation or management of a “foreign agent” NGO whose
activities are “associated with inciting citizens to refuse to fulfill their
civic duties”—which are not defined—carries a liability of a
RUB200,000 fine or the forfeiture of eighteen months’ salary or other
compensation; up to three years’ imprisonment; or the same term of
community service.43 “Participation in” such an organization is
punishable by a fine of up to RUB120,000 or the forfeiture of a year’s
salary or other income, or two years in prison or of community
service.44 Notably, the statute’s language does not limit liability to the
organization’s employees or directors, and could include, for
example, a volunteer translator.45 An organization’s failure to register
as a foreign agent—or, as it is put in the statute, its “desertion of
duties”—once satisfying the requirements carries a fine of up to
RUB300,000 or two years’ salary or other income, up to 480 hours of
compulsory labor, or correctional labor or imprisonment for up to two
years.46
iii. Inspections of foreign agent organizations
The Foreign Agent Law prescribes more than registration
requirements and fines. Russian NGOs receiving funding from
42. Moscow School of Civic Education Added to the Foreign Agents List, RUSSIAN
LEGAL INFO. AGENCY (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://rapsinews.com/news/20141209/
272741463.html (noting that “Russia’s Justice Ministry has put the Moscow School of Civic
Education on the foreign agents list”); Federal'nyj zakon 121 “Ob inostrannyh agentah” [The
Federal Law “On Foreign Agents”] RIA NOVOSTI (June 16, 2014, 9:19 AM),
http://ria.ru/spravka/20140616/1011656413.html (noting that on June 4, 2014, President Putin
signed an amendment to the law “giving the Justice Ministry of Russia the right to include
non-commercial organizations to the register of ‘foreign agents’ of its own accord”).
43. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2, art. 3.2 (assigning RUB200,000 liability for
“foreign agent” organizations that “incite citizens to abandonment of civic duties”). For
context, RUB100,000 was equivalent to about US$1735.00 in the third week of March, 2015.
At the time of the passage of the statute, it was equivalent to about US$3030. The average
annual gross salary in Russia was RUB388,896 (as of the third week of March, 2015,
equivalent to about US$6750) in 2013.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2, art. 3.1 (assigning RUB300,000 liability, or prison
time or compulsory labor, for an organization’s failure to register).
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outside Russia are also subject to “routine checks” by federal law
enforcement.47 In practice, these function as random, unannounced
raids on operations-related and other official documents and
sometimes computers.48
3. The Rights and Freedoms Law
In December 2012, the Russian legislature passed the Rights and
Freedoms Law.49 This statute was covered in Western media due to a
provision banning US citizens from adopting Russian children.50 The
Rights and Freedoms Law is said to be a response to the so-called
Magnitsky Act passed by the US Congress in 2012, which bars
particular members of the Russian political class from entering the
United States or accessing the US banking system.51
47. Id. art. 5.zh (specifying fines without explaining whose “salary or other income”
would set the standard for liability for failure to register as a “foreign agent”).
48. Russian police raid rights group Memorial and other NGOs, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22,
2013, 7:21 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21896424 (noting that “up to 2,000
organisations had been targeted with inspections and searches” in March 2013 alone); Raids In
Russia On Foreign NGOs Spark International Concern, NPR (Mar. 27, 2013, 11:40 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/03/27/175466242/raids-in-russia-on-foreign-ngosspark-international-concern (noting unannounced searches of various internationally-funded
human rights NGOs across Russia in March 2013).
49. Federal'nyj zakon ot 28 dekabrja 2012 goda N 272-FZ “O merah vozdejstvija na lic,
prichastnyh k narushenijam osnovopolagajushhih prav i svobod cheloveka, prav i svobod
grazhdan Rossijskoj Federacii” [Federal Law from December 28, 2012 No. 272-FZ “On
measures against persons involved in violations of fundamental rights and freedoms of the
person, rights and freedoms [sic] of citizens of the Russian Federation”] [hereinafter the Rights
and Freedoms Law]. It became effective the following month.
50. Id. art. 4.1 (“It is prohibited to transfer children who are citizens of the Russian
Federation for [adoption] by citizens of the United States of America”); see also Putin Signs
TIMES,
Bill
That
Bars
U.S.
Adoptions,
Upending
Families,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/28/world/europe/putin-to-sign-ban-on-us-adoptions-ofrussian-children.html; Russia: Vladimir Putin Signs Bill Banning Americans From Adopting
Russian Children, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 28, 2012) (asserting that the law is “part of a
harsh response to a U.S. law targeting Russians deemed to be human rights violators”).
51. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law
Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, § 404, 126 Stat. 1496; Darya Lyubinskaya,
Ban on U.S. Citizens Adopting Russian Children May Be Amended, RUSSIA BEYOND THE
HEADLINES
(Feb.
12,
2015,
5:42
PM),
http://rbth.com/news/2015/02/12/
ban_on_us_citizens_adopting_russian_children_may_be_amended_43659.html (“The law is
described as a response to the so-called Magnitsky Bill in the United States”); Children's
Ombudsman Wants Probe Into U.S. Adoptions of Russian Orphans, THE MOSCOW TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2015, 6:36 PM) http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/children-sombudsman-wants-probe-into-u-s-adoptions-of-russian-orphans/515706.html (“Russia passed
a law banning U.S. adoptions in 2012, in retaliation for the U.S. Magnitsky Act”). The Russia
and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2012, Pub.L. 112–208 (2012), personally sanctions eighteen Russian nationals, the majority of
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The first provision of the Rights and Freedoms Law specifically
bans US citizens who meet various requirements—for example,
engagement in “unjustified legal actions” against Russians—from
entering the Russian Federation.52 According to this law, Russians
holding dual citizenship with the United States are barred from
leadership of, or “membership” in, an NGO or “foreign agent”
organization in any capacity.53 This provision authorizes the President
of Russia to order the assets seizure of an NGO that employs or
otherwise associates with a US citizen in violation of the section on
participation in the NGO’s activities.54 The executive may authorize
such an organization to resume operations if it either stops receiving
money from US sources, or ceases operation in Russian territory.55
This law allows courts to shut down NGOs receiving support from the
United States, as well as organizations that run projects, programs, or
other activities on Russian territory that are seen as threatening to
Russian interests.56
4. The Dual Citizenship Law
In July 2014, the Russian legislature amended the law “On
Citizenship,” thereby creating the Dual Citizenship Law.57 This law
them officials seen as linked to the torture and subsequent death in prison of Russian
whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, as well as another individual seen as the hired assassin of
Forbes Magazine journalist Paul Klebnikov, who was shot dead on the street in Moscow in
2004.
52. Rights and Freedoms Law, supra note 49, art. 1.1 (Americans “involved in violations
of fundamental human rights and freedoms” or “engaged in unjustified legal actions against
citizens of the Russian Federation” are nominally prohibited from entering the country). This
provision is a not-so-veiled reference to members of the American political class directly
involved in sanctions regimes affecting Russian nationals.
53. Id. art. 3.2 (“A Russian citizen, having United States citizenship, may not be a
member or director of a non-profit organization . . . or the structural unit of an international or
foreign non-profit organization . . . participating in political activities carried out in the
territory of the Russian Federation.”).
54. Id. art. 3.3 (stating that “the decision to impose a seizure is made by a court at the
request of the federal executive”).
55. Id. art. 3.4 (the organization’s activities may be resumed “by decision of the federal
executive authority responsible for the formulation and implementation of public policy and
legal regulations in the sphere of registration of non-profit organizations”). The statute does
not reveal the sources of the Russian executive’s power to authorize the operation of a civil
organization located outside Russian territory.
56. Kremlin statement in English regarding the Rights and Freedoms Law, available at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/4810 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
57. Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii ot 30 ijulja 2014 g. N 733 “Ob
utverzhdenii Pravil osushhestvlenija Federal'noj migracionnoj sluzhboj i ee territorial'nymi
organami ucheta pis'mennyh uvedomlenij o nalichii u grazhdan Rossijskoj Federacii
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requires Russian citizens who permanently reside in Russia and hold
dual citizenship with any other State to register with the federal
government.58 Dual-citizen Russians are required to register within
sixty days of acquiring the second citizenship, after which they are
subject to criminal liability.59 The related article of the Russian
Criminal Code imposes a fine of up to RUB200,000 for the failure to
timely register a second citizenship or residency.60
5. The Expatriate Amendments
In June, July, and December 2014, Russia’s legislature amended
its law “On Foreign Citizens,” creating the Expatriate Amendments.61
The changes to the law require certain classes of non-Russians
seeking work permits or other long-term residency in Russia to pass a
Russian language and culture exam.62 The certificate demonstrating
grazhdanstva inogo gosudarstva” [Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of
July 30, 2014 g. No. 733, Moscow, “On approval of the Rules of the Federal Migration
Service and its territorial bodies on the written accounting of citizens of the Russian Federation
of the citizenship of another government”] [hereinafter the Dual Citizenship Law].
58. Id. art. 1 (establishing “a procedure for the [Federal Migration Service] to receive
from citizens of the Russian Federation” or their legal guardians “(except for Russian citizens
permanently residing outside the Russian Federation), written notice” that they hold
citizenship with another state).
59. Federal’nyi Zakon “O grazhdanstve Rossijskoj Federacii” [Federal Law “On
citizenship of the Russian Federation”], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII, [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation], 2014, No. 62-FZ, art. 6.3
(Requiring any Russian citizen permanently residing in Russia to submit a written notice of,
inter alia, his “other citizenship or residence permit, or other valid document confirming the
right to permanent residency in a foreign country . . . within sixty days from the date of
receipt” of the second citizenship or residency permit).
60. Ugolovnyj kodeks Rossijskoj Federacii [UK RF] [Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation] art. 330.2 (Russ.) (“a fine of up to two hundred thousand rubles or the salary or
other income for a period of up to one year, or compulsory labor for a term of up to four
hundred hours”). Note that at the time of passage, this sum was more than half the average
Russian annual net income.
61. Federal'nyj zakon ot 25.07.2002 N 115-FZ (red. ot 01.12.2014) “O pravovom
polozhenii inostrannyh grazhdan v Rossijskoj Federacii” [Federal Law from 25 July 2002, N
115-FZ (amend. from 1 December 2014) “On the legal status of foreign nationals in the
Russian Federation”](hereinafter the Expatriate Amendments). In addition to the provisions on
the Russian language and culture proficiency certification, the 2014 amendments include, for
example, extensive additions to sections on the deportation and transfer of foreign nationals to
their home states or to third states. They became effective January 1, 2015.
62. Id. art. 15.1 (“Foreign Nationals' Confirmation of Russian Language Skills,
Knowledge of the History of Russia and Foundations of Law of the Russian Federation. (1.
Unless otherwise provided by international treaty of the Russian Federation and the present
article, the foreign citizen, when applying for a temporary residence permit, residence permit,
work permit or patent . . . shall confirm knowledge of the Russian language, knowledge of the
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passage of the exam is valid for five years; the law does not address
renewal.63
6. The “Aggressor” Bill
A late-summer 2014 legislative proposal calls for the creation
and maintenance of a federal register of lawyers, accountants, other
professionals, as well as some corporations that are registered in
“aggressor states.”64 This law went to the State Duma for a vote in the
first week of December 2014.65 Though not referred to by name, the
United States is implicitly identified as an “aggressor state” given
reference to governments imposing sanctions on the Russian
Federation or on Russian nationals personally—both of which the
United States has done during President Putin’s third term.66 A memo
attached to the bill notes, “given the aggressive and unpartnerlike
behavior of countries imposing restrictive [sanctions] with respect to
the Russian Federation, citizens [thereof] and Russian legal entities,
the bill introduces a definition of ‘aggressor.’”67 Under the Aggressor
Bill, the Russian government would classify another State as an

history of Russia, and the foundations of law of the Russian Federation” by producing, inter
alia, “a certificate of proficiency in Russian, knowledge of the history of Russia, and the legal
framework of the Russian Federation.”).
63. Id. art. 15.1.3 (“The validity of the certificate . . . shall be five years from its date of
issuance.”).
64. Federal’nyi Zakon #667782-6 O vvedenii mer zashhity nacional'noj jekonomiki
Rossijskoj Federacii i ogranichenii dejatel'nosti juridicheskih lic i grazhdan stran agressorov na
territorii Rossijskoj Federacii Izvestija [Federal Law #667782-6 On the introduction of
measures to protect the national economy of the Russian Federation and the limitation of legal
entities and citizens of aggressors on the territory of the Russian Federation], Dec. 13, 2014
[hereinafter the Aggressor Bill] (including explanatory note that, “Given the aggressive
behavior of partner countries imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation, citizens of the
Russian Federation and Russian legal entities, the bill introduces a definition of ‘aggressor.’”);
Gosduma vvedet v zakonodatel'stvo ponjatie “strana-agressor” [The State Duma will
Introduce the Notion of the “Aggressor Country” into Legislation], IZVESTIIA, (Jul. 29, 2014,
12:01 AM), http://izvestia.ru/news/574512 (On parliamentary deputies' intent to “introduce a
new concept in the Russian legislation - the ‘aggressor state.’ According to deputies, the law
will spell out that 'an aggressor is a state that introduces sanctions against the Russian
Federation, Russian citizens, and Russian legal entities.’”).
65. Rossijskaja Gazeta, Zakonoproekt o stranah-agressorah postupil v Gosdumu [The
Bill on Aggressor-Countries was submitted to the Duma], ROS. GAZ., (Dec. 3, 2014, 6:50 PM)
http://www.rg.ru/2014/12/03/agressori-site.html (“Companies and individuals from aggressorcountries, by design, will be banned from certain activities”).
66. See supra note 51 (discussing the U. Magnitsky Act).
67. Aggressor Bill, supra note 64, at Explanatory Note.
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“aggressor” within thirty days of that State’s issuing sanctions or
other restrictive measures against Russia or Russian nationals.68
The Aggressor Bill invokes both the economic and national
security implications of foreign interference in Russian affairs as
impetuses for its creation.69 As law, the Aggressor Bill would bar
foreign legal entities and individuals registered in the aggressor
country from providing legal and other advisory services on Russian
territory.70 This ban would also extend to Russian legal entities
affiliated with or reliant upon foreign companies, organizations, or
individuals for operational support, thus covering organizations not
subject to the Foreign Agent Law.71
7. The Undesirable Organizations Bill
In one of Russia’s first legislative movements of 2015, the State
Duma preliminarily approved in the first reading the Undesirable
Organizations Bill, which seeks to amend portions of the Rights and
Freedoms Law.72 This bill would give the Russian government the
power to deem certain foreign and international organizations
“undesirable.”73 Organizations deemed undesirable would have their
68. Id. art. 1.2 (“The leadership of the Russian Federation, in order to protect the
constitutional order, the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, the country's defense and state
security, the protection of the domestic market and the national economy of the Russian
Federation, will approve a list of aggressors within thirty days of the date of acceptance of
restrictive measures (sanctions)”).
69. Id. at Conclusion (noting that current geopolitics “require an immediate response to
foreign countries' internationally unlawful acts or unfriendly actions that threaten the interests
and security of the Russian Federation and (or) violate the rights and freedoms of its citizens”).
70. Id. art. 1.3 (Requiring that corporations and individuals linked to “aggressor
governments” shall be “prohibited from conducting on the territory of the Russian Federation
auditing, legal, and other consultation services”).
71. Id. (Applying the ban to “foreign legal entities registered on the territory of the
aggressor country, citizens of such countries, and likewise Russian legal individuals affiliated
or dependent upon such foreign legal entities”).
72. Russia: Law on ‘Undesirable Organizations’ Will Further Tighten the Noose on
Dissent, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 20, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
articles/news/2015/01/russia-law-undesirable-organizations-will-further-tighten-noose-dissent/
(noting that the bill had passed its first reading and that it would “go through two more
readings before being sent to President Vladimir Putin to be signed into law”). Some
legislators expressed uncertainty to Russian media in late February 2015 over the necessity of
such a law, extending the deadline on amendments; Andrej Vinokurov, Nezhelatel'nyj zakon
otkladyvaetsja [Undesirable Law Delayed], GAZETA.RU, (Feb. 20, 2015, 10:00 PM),
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/02/20_a_6421141.shtml (“the fate of the bill on
undesirable foreign organizations appears to have fallen into question”).
73. Federalnyi Zakon o vnesenii izmenenij v nekotorye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossijskoj
federacii, No. 662902-S at STAT. 1, 2014 [Federal Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative
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activities limited or banned on Russian territory, and their assets
could potentially be frozen.74 These organizations are described
generally as those presenting a threat to Russian “defensibility” or
State security.75 Organizations presenting perceived threats to social
order or public health are also described as targets in the Undesirable
Organizations Bill.76 A related provision would amend the Russian
Criminal Code to include a fine reaching RUB500,000 for continued
operations following an “undesirable” determination.77
If accepted as law, the Undesirable Organizations Bill would
create another federal register; in contrast to other Russian federal
registers of organizations, this would exclusively feature non-Russian
and international organizations.78 The bill explicitly asserts that the
Prosecutor General, in consultation with the executive, should
determine which organizations are to be deemed “undesirable.”79
Acts of the Russian Federation] [hereinafter Undesirable Organizations Bill] The ban on
activities would range from operations in brick-and-mortar offices, for example, to publication
on the Internet and elsewhere. See art. 1.2.1-3.
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 1.2 (“The activities of foreign or international organizations presenting a
threat to the defensibility or security of the state, or otherwise to social order or public health,
in order to preserve the foundations of constitutional order, morality, rights and the legal
interests of various entities, may be deemed undesirable on the territory of the Russian
Federation”).
76. Id. These provisions would form a new Article 3 of the Rights and Freedoms Law.
77. Id. art. 4. (Violations would be “punishable by a fine of three hundred thousand to
five hundred thousand rubles or the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period
of two to three years, or community service of up to five years, with the restriction of liberty
for a term of up to two years, or without a fine, either arrest from four to six months, or
imprisonment for a term of two to eight years with restrictions on the right to occupy certain
positions or to engage in certain activities for a period of up to ten years, or a restriction of
liberty of up to two years, or without a fine.”). RUB500,000 was equivalent to USD$8282
during the third week of March, 2015.
78. Id. at Perechen’, section 2 (The law would require “publication by the Ministry of
Justice of the Russian Federation . . . an order establishing the procedure of maintenance for a
list of foreign and international organizations working in the Russian Federation recognized to
be undesirable.”). Compared with the Foreign Agent Law and the Aggressor Bill, respectively.
Note that in addition to the Federal List of Foreign Agent Organizations, the Russian Ministry
of Justice also maintains, inter alia, a Federal List of Extremist Materials (banned literature
and other media, including such granular items as single individual posts to social media) and
a Federal List of Extremist Organizations (purportedly a list of groups presenting a security
threat to Russia, but primarily minority religious and ethnic movements, with some neo-Nazi
groups).
79. Id. art. 1.2 (“А decision on the recognition of the undesirable activities on the
territory of the Russian Federation of foreign or international organizations shall be adopted by
the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation in coordination with the federal
executive authority . . . based on information and documents received from police and security
agencies and other federal executive bodies.”).
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In an explanatory note attached to the Undesirable Organizations
Bill, the authoring legislators refer generally to internal politics,
military concerns, and international conflicts facilitating the
development of “destructive organizations” on Russian territory.80
These organizations are said to espouse terrorist, extremist, or
nationalist ideologies.81 They also assert that obstructions to such
organizations’ attempts to influence Russia’s social and political
institutions should be seen as a primary objective of the Russian
government.82 These laws are designed to restrict expression and
association, but for reasons that conflate human rights and other civil
reporting with extremist ideologies or threats to State security.83 For
these reasons, international human rights law provides recourse.
C. The Foundations of Recourse: Russia’s International Human
Rights Obligations
This Section outlines the Russian Federation’s international
human rights obligations. As a member of the Council of Europe,
Russia is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, as
discussed in Part I.C.1. Russia also has various obligations as a
ratifying State of the ICCPR, which is the subject of Part I.C.2. This
Section also covers obligations under the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR, which Russia has ratified. Both treaties protect the right
to expression and association, while the ICCPR also protects the right
to reputation.
1. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights, which became
effective in 1953, obligates States Parties—which includes all
members of the Council of Europe—to protect human rights and
80. Id. Pojasnitel'naja zapiska k proektu federal'nogo zakon O vnesenii izemenenij v
nekotorye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossijskoj Federacii [Clarification Note on the Federal Bill on
Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation] Nov. 27, 2014 (“Internalpolitical, military, and international conflicts, which in recent days have drawn in more and
more governments, are paving the way for the development of destructive organizations on
their territories.”).
81. Id. (asserting that such organizations, which propagate “criminal goals,” “espouse
terrorist, extremist, and nationalist ideas.”).
82. Id. (“Counteracting the penetration of these organizations on the territory of the
Russian Federation, and blocking their attempts to influence the social and political institutions
of Russian society, must be regarded as a priority area for the organs of government power.”)
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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freedoms spanning several thematic areas.84 Russia ratified the
Convention, with some reservations and understandings, in May
1998.85 For this Note, Articles 10 and 11, which address freedom of
expression and freedom of association, respectively, are at issue.86
While Section I of the Convention enumerates rights protections,
Section II establishes the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) in Strasbourg, France.87 The ECtHR hears applications
from individuals, organizations, and High Contracting Parties alleging
that a given State Party has violated one or more of the Convention’s
provisions regarding civil and political rights.88 In addition to
judgments, the ECtHR has jurisdiction to advise on interpretive
questions concerning the Convention and its Protocols.89
The ECtHR employs the margin of appreciation doctrine in
deciding cases against High Contracting Parties.90 Under margin of
84. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5
[hereinafter European Convention]. See, e.g., id. art. 3 (the prohibition on torture); id. art. 7
(the prohibition on retroactive criminal laws); id. art. 11 (freedom of assembly); id. art. 12 (the
right to marry).
85. Council of Europe, List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No. 005
(Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=&CL
=ENG&VL=1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2015). Russia’s reservations and declarations apply almost
exclusively to criminal procedure.
86. European Convention, supra note 84, arts. 10-11. Article 10 states, in relevant part,
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.” Id. Subsection 2 of Article 10
permits restrictions on this right that are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society,” in the interests of national security the protection of health or morals, or that are
subject to legal privilege. Id. Article 11 states, in relevant part, “1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, and to
freedom of association with others,” with the same list of permitted restrictions as the previous
Article. Id.
87. Id. (establishing the European Court of Human Rights) [hereinafter the ECtHR].
88. Id. art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.”); Id. art.
33 (“Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions
of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.”).
89. Id. art. 47.1 (“The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the
Protocols thereto.”).
90. In Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 48 (Dec. 7, 1976), the Court
locates the “margin of appreciation” doctrine in Article 10.2 of the Convention, which
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appreciation, the ECtHR defers to the laws and customs of the States
being sued.91 This practice is the ECtHR’s effort to consider the
norms of different High Contracting Parties.92
Russian individuals and organizations frequently bring cases to
the ECtHR.93 For example, the ECtHR ruled recently that Russia
violated, inter alia, the Article 11 rights of a prominent liberal
nationalist politician and an associate opposition member who faced
prosecution related to their role in organizing a rally.94 Notably in that
ruling, the ECtHR recognized that the margin of appreciation has its
own limits, including that some interferences with rights must meet a
social need and be proportionate to that need.95
2. Redress for Repression Through the United Nations System: The
ICCPR and the First Optional Protocol
i. Rights implicated under the ICCPR
The ICCPR, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966,
creates obligations on States Parties to ensure the civil and political
rights of individuals subject to their jurisdiction, including the
freedoms of speech, assembly, electoral rights, due process, a fair
trial, and others.96 The UN Human Rights Committee, which was
describes allowable instances of rights restrictions. The Handyside Court states that domestic
European legislators enjoy the margin of appreciation when writing laws restricting rights,
while judicial bodies enjoy it when interpreting and applying laws in force.
91. Id. (stating, “The Court points out that the machinery of protection established by the
Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights[.] The Convention
leaves to each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of securing the rights and liberties it
enshrines.”)
92. Id. ¶ 57 (“The Contracting States have each fashioned their approach in the light of
the situation obtaining in their respective territories; they have had regard, inter alia, to the
different views prevailing there about the demands of the protection of morals in a democratic
society”).
93. See, e.g., The European Court of Human Rights’ online opinion depository,
HUDOC,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["russian
federation"],"sort":["kpdate Descending"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER,"
"CHAMBER"]} (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) (listing European Court rulings including the
Russian Federation as a party, including eight alone in the first three months of 2015.
94. See Navalnyy & Yashin v. Russia, 76204/11 (Dec. 4, 2014).
95. Id. ¶ 53 (stating, in relevant part, “When examining whether restrictions on the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention can be considered ‘necessary in a democratic
society,’ the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation.”).
96. ICCPR, supra note 27 (“Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into
force 23 March 1976”).
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established pursuant to ICCPR Article 28, monitors compliance with
the Covenant.97 Committee Review follows communications, as
complaints to the Committee are called, by individuals—but not
organizations or groups of individuals—regarding a State Party’s
violation of given provisions of the ICCPR.98 Committee Review may
also follow a regular report on implementation of the Covenant,
which States Parties are required to submit to the Committee within
one year of the Covenant’s entry into force, and whenever the
Committee requests such a report thereafter.99 The Soviet Union, to
which the Russian Federation is the legal successor, ratified the
ICCPR in 1973.100
For the purposes of this discussion, the ICCPR provisions of
interest are Articles 17, 19, and 22, which treat the right to reputation,
freedom of expression, and freedom of association, respectively.101
Article 17 has two subsections. The first protects nationals of States
Parties against, inter alia, unlawful interference with their honor or
reputation.102 States Parties are obligated under the second provision
97. Id. art. 28.1 (“There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter
referred to in the present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members and
shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.”).
98. United Nations Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, infra note 112, art. 1 (“A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the
present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a
violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”).
99. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 40.
100. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General IV.4 (Human Rights), at sec. Declarations and
Reservations. The Soviet Union’s one declaration to the Covenant, which Russia inherited,
reads:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that the provisions of . . . article
48 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, under which a
number of States cannot become parties to [the ICCPR and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights], are of a discriminatory nature
and considers that the Covenants, in accordance with the principle of sovereign
equality of States, should be open for participation by all States concerned without
any discrimination or limitation.
101. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 17.1 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.”); id. art. 19.2 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice”); id. art. 22.1 (“Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests”).
102. Id. art. 17.1.
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of Article 17 to give legal protections and recourse to the victims of
such attacks.103 Section 2 of Article 19 guarantees the “freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print.”104 Article 22
guarantees freedom of association in brief, general terms.105 Section 2
of Article 22 describes permissible restrictions on that freedom, for
example those “necessary in a democratic society.”106
In colloquial Russian, the term “foreign agent” is equivalent with
“spy.”107 For this reason, Article 17’s protections on reputation are
implicated.108 The political rhetoric in question has real consequences;
for example, consider the February 2015 assassination of Russian
liberal opposition politician Boris Nemtsov following his designation
in State media as an “internal enemy.”109 Though Nemtsov was not
designated an “enemy of Russia” by any of the laws discussed here,
he was by State media.110 Where a State Party deems certain members

103. Id. art. 17.2.
104. Id. art. 19.2. Russia will come up for review in its second Universal Periodic
Review round in January 2018. In its first review (2013), Russia did not accept a single
recommendation addressing ICCPR Article 19, which it asserts to be non-universal.
105. Id. art. 22.1 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests”).
106. Id. art. 22.2 (“No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of
public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall
not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the
police in their exercise of this right.”). Russia has a law on public emergencies that it could use
to legally restrict freedom of association under ICCPR Article 22, but has not invoked it in a
decade.
107. Proverka peterburgskoj organizacii “Nemecko-russkij obmen” napugala Berlin
[Check of Petersburg Organization “German-Russian Exchange” Scares Berln],
PETERBURGSKIJ DNEVNIK, available at http://www.spbdnevnik.ru/news/2015-01-21/proverkapeterburgskoy-organizatsii--nemetsko-russkiy-obmen--napugala-berlin/
(quoting
St.
Petersburg NGO employee discussing “foreign agent” designation as equal to designation as
agent of foreign power); see also infra note 128 (Wash. Post article noting “foreign agent” as
“a term used in Stalin’s day to stigmatize and discredit people as spies.”).
108. ICCPR, supra note 27, art. 17.1 (“No one shall be subjected to . . . unlawful attacks
on his honour and reputation.”).
109. See Andrew E. Kramer, Fear Envelops Russia After Killing of Putin Critic Boris
Nemtsov, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2015; see also Ivan Nechepurenko, Analysts Blame Nemtsov’s
Death on Russia’s ‘Legitimized Hate’, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 28, 2015 (noting that statedirected media had “emphatically placed” Nemtsov “in the category of enemies” of Russian
society).
110. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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of society as somehow anti-Russian, creating real threats to physical
safety, the protection of reputation is certainly implicated.111
ii. The individual complaint mechanism
The General Assembly adopted the Protocol in December 1966,
and it entered into force in March 1976.112 The individual complaint
mechanism came into force simultaneously.113 Pursuant to the
Protocol, an individual under the State Party’s jurisdiction may file a
complaint to the Committee for violations of rights protected in the
Covenant.114
The Russian Federation acceded to the Protocol in 1991, thereby
recognizing the Committee’s competence to review complaints
regarding Russia.115 The Soviet Union’s single understanding to the
Protocol does not effectively modify its legal status in Russia.116 This
is because the Understanding requires that the complaint not be under
review at another international tribunal, and that its author has
exhausted the domestic court system.117 The language of the
Understanding is nearly identical to that of Article 5.2 of the
Protocol.118

111. Nemtsov, a longtime and vocal critic of President Putin, had been repeatedly
declared a “national traitor” and a member of the hated “fifth column” by state media. See
supra note 109 and accompanying text; Joshua Yaffa, Assassination in Moscow, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 27, 2015, available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/assassination-in-moscow (describing Russian state media’s fixation on a dubious cabal of
“national traitors,” of which Boris Nemtsov was alleged to be one).
112. UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Protocol].
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 1.
115. Id.
116. “The Soviet Union also proceeds from the understanding that the Committee shall
not consider any communications unless it has been ascertained that the same matter is not
being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement and that
the individual in question has exhausted all available domestic remedies” Id. at Declarations
and Reservations, Russian Federation (replace “Soviet Union” with “Russian Federation”).
117. See id.
118. See id. art. 5.2 (“The Committee shall not consider any communication from an
individual unless it has ascertained that [t]he same matter is not being examined under another
procedure of international investigation or settlement [and t]he individual has exhausted all
available domestic remedies. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is
unreasonably prolonged.”). The Soviet Union’s understanding eliminates the exception for
constructive domestic exhaustion under “unreasonable prolongation” of process, which not
coincidentally characterized the Soviet justice system.
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The Protocol requires that the aggrieved individual personally
file the complaint with the Committee, that the subject of the
complaint is not currently under review at another international
forum, and that the complainant has exhausted domestic remedies.119
Once admissibility is determined, the Committee raises the issue of
contention with the State Party, who is required to submit to the
Committee within six months “written explanations or statements
clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken
by that State.”120
Only individuals, and not organizations or groups of individuals,
may file complaints under the Protocol.121 Though the Committee
discussed the prospect of allowing groups or organizations to file, the
final Committee rules of procedure did not include this option.122
There are “no formal cooperation arrangements between the
Committee and NGOs,” but NGOs regularly file documents in
support of individual communications to the Committee.123

119. Id. art. 3; id. art. 5.2.a-b.
120. Id. art. 4.
121. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122. See annotations to the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights as prepared
by the Secretary-General, 10 U.N. GAOR Annex at 81, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955) (“Opinion
was deeply divided concerning the right to initiate proceedings before the committee. Some
held that only States should be allowed to appeal to the committee. Others proposed various
ways of enlarging the right to initiate proceedings. In resolution 421 (V), section F, the
General Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to consider provisions ‘to be
inserted in the draft covenant or in separate protocols, for the receipt and examination of
petitions from individuals and organizations with respect to alleged violations of the
covenant’. Again, by resolution 737 B(VIII), the Assembly transmitted to the Commission a
proposal requesting it to draft ‘provisions recognizing the right of petition of every natural
person, every duly constituted group of individuals and every recognized non-govern- mental
organization’, for inclusion in the covenant in accordance with the decision of the General
Assembly in its resolution 421 (V), section F, mentioned above. All the proposals, which
would extend the right to initiate proceedings, were either rejected or withdrawn.”). Report of
the Ninth Session of the Human Rights Commission, 16 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8), 16-17,
U.N. Doc. E/2447 (1953) (“[C]ertain non-governmental organizations could bring to the notice
of the United Nations matters falling within the purview of the Economic and Social Council
and this recognition should be taken into account in considering the admissibility of
communications from non-governmental organizations. To limit the right of complaint . . .
would hamper the work which those organizations were doing, and would make the United
Nations appear isolated in the eyes of many ordinary people. They strongly supported the
proposals which empowered the Committee to act on its own motion and to receive
communications from non-governmental organizations and individuals.”).
123. Ida Lintel & Cedric Ryngaert, The Interface between Non-Governmental
Organisations and the Human Rights Committee, 15 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 359, 361 (2013).
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After deliberating on admissibility and the merits, the
Committee issues “Views,” which are distributed to the aggrieved
individual and the receiving State Party.124 While Committee Views
were once characterized as “non-binding recommendations” to the
State Party, the Committee has stated more recently that the Views
are legally binding.125 Prominent Russian human rights attorneys
have expressed doubts as to the ICCPR’s individual complaint
mechanism, citing the “very uncertain legal status” of the Committee
Views and the effectiveness and timeliness of UN institutions.126
Academic authorities, however, assert that Committee Views do
constitute “hard law,” and thus are binding on States Parties.127
To provide context for the analysis ahead, Part I first
discussed the structure of the Russian government, including the
places of the executive, the legislature, and the courts in it. It then
surveyed recent Russian federal legislation to demonstrate a
legislative trend predicated on limiting foreign influence in Russian
society. The statutes and bills in question were all passed or proposed
in the first half of the third presidential term of Vladimir V. Putin,
which began in May 2012.
The laws and bills described create various obligations for
Russian nationals and are thematically linked in their effort to combat
non-Russian interference with Russian society. The Foreign Agents
Law requires civil organizations receiving funding from abroad to
register and advertise their status as “foreign agents.” The Dual
Citizenship Law imposes sizeable criminal fines on Russian nationals
failing to report dual citizenship to the federal government within
sixty days of acquiring the second citizenship. The Rights and
Freedoms Law bans the adoption of Russian children by US parents.
The Aggressor Bill proposes a federal register of foreign individuals
and corporations allegedly linked to “aggressor states.” Finally, the
Undesirable Organizations Bill seeks to ban the operations of foreign
and international organizations deemed “undesirable.”
Part I closed with an examination of Russia’s international legal
obligations. Of primary interest are those regarding right to reputation
124. Protocol, supra note 112, art. 5.4.
125. Report of the Human Rights Committee (1997), U.N. Doc. A/52/40 94, ¶ 532;
Report of the Human Rights Committee (1988), U.N. Doc. A/43/40 151, ¶ 645.
126. See correspondence on file with the author.
127. J. TH. MOLLER & A. DE ZAYAS, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
CASE LAW, 1977-2008: A HANDBOOK 48 (2009) (“[T]he views constitute international case
law and, as such, may be considered as part of what is known as ‘hard law.’”).
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and freedom of expression and association, particularly under the
European Convention on Human Rights and the ICCPR. Finally, a
brief discussion of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR outlined
how Russian individuals may seek recourse at the United Nations
Human Rights Committee following the application of the national
laws at issue.
II. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
Prosecutions of Russian nationals under the new federal laws
discussed above highlight the practical implications of the described
legislative trend. Part II explores some notable prosecutions and
discusses the Russian government’s targeting of an American attorney
married to a Russian human rights activist, based on allegations that
her presence in the country threatened national security. A discussion
of international human rights jurisprudence regarding the rights
implicated by the relevant statutes from Part I follows.
A. The Foreign Agent Law
While the Foreign Agent Law was in effect by November 2012,
investigators and prosecutors only started enforcing it at the end of
March 2013.128 Speaking on February 14, 2013 about NGOs
operating in Russia, President Putin warned that foreign governments
hoping to weaken Russia are known to use “various instruments of
pressure, including mechanisms of so-called ‘soft power.’”129 Though
128. Russia Again Tries to Intimidate Civil Society Groups, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russia-again-tries-to-intimidate-civil-societygroups/2013/03/27/99b4e0ac-9717-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html (noting investigators’
inspection of the offices of Memorial “this week for the third time, along with those of dozens
of other groups. The raids appear to be a concerted effort by President Vladimir Putin to
intimidate such organizations. Last year, Mr. Putin pushed through legislation requiring
nongovernmental groups that receive money from abroad and are involved in politics to
register as ‘foreign agents,’ a term used in Stalin’s day to stigmatize and discredit people as
spies.”); Russian Search for ‘Foreign Agents’ Widens as NGOs Raided, EURONEWS.COM,
Mar. 28, 2013, http://www.euronews.com/2013/03/28/russian-search-for-foreign-agentswidens-as-ngos-raided/ (noting the March 2013 initiation of raids after a February
announcement by President Putin “that to crack down on ‘terrorism’ he would be focusing on
‘foreign agents.’ That was seen as a veiled threat, which now appears to have turned into
action.”).
129. Prezident Rossii, Zasedanie kollegii Federal'noj sluzhby bezopasnosti [President of
Russia, Meeting of Colleagues of the Federal Security Service], Feb. 14, 2013,
http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/17516 (Speaking of NGOs receiving operational funding from
abroad, President Putin states that “any direct or indirect interference in our internal affairs,
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the Foreign Agents Law had lain dormant for a year, by the third
week of March 2013, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
Transparency International, and Memorial—Russia’s oldest
consistently operating human rights reporting organization—were all
visited and inspected by federal law enforcement officials.130
In April 2014, the Constitutional Court of Russia—the country’s
supreme court—upheld the constitutionality of the Foreign Agents
Law.131 At the end of 2014, the Federal Register of Information on
NGOs Acting as a Foreign Agent included twenty organizations
located across Russia, while at the beginning of 2015, it included
forty-one.132 Three of these organizations registered voluntarily
following adverse administrative rulings.133 Moscow, home to twelve
organizations on the list, is the most-represented city.134
The organizations on the Register are involved in, inter alia,
LGBT advocacy, elections monitoring, civil liberties litigation
reporting, pro bono advocacy, and compiling information on the
any form of pressure on Russia, our allies and partners is unacceptable.”) The clear message of
President Putin’s speech to the security services seemed to spark swift action.
130. Russia’s Putin calls NGO inspections “routine”, REUTERS http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/03/28/us-russia-ngos-idUSBRE92R0MF20130328 (Mar. 28, 2013) (“Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Memorial, Russia's oldest rights group, are among
those whose offices have been visited by prosecutors and other state officials, prompting
criticism from the United States and the European Union.”); Harvey Morris, Raids in Russia
Target ‘Foreign Agents', N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, available at http://
rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/raids-in-russia-target-foreign-agents/.
131. Konstitucionnyj sud odobril zapis' v “inostrannye agenty” [Constitutional Court
Endorses “Foreign Agents” on the Record], KOMMERSANT, http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2447993 (Apr. 4, 2014) (“Today the Supreme Court (KS) of Russia decided on a
complaint from non-commercial organizations, claiming the legislation requiring human rights
organizations register as ‘foreign agents’ to be unconstitutional. It affirmed that the relevant
requirements of the legislation complied with the Russian Constitution, but recommended a
reduction to fines for NGOs.”); Russia: Constitutional Court Upholds ‘Foreign Agents’ Law,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 9, 2014) http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/08/russiaconstitutional-court-upholds-foreign-agents-law (“Russia’s Constitutional Court has upheld the
controversial ‘foreign agents’ law.”).
132. Svedenija reestra NKO, vypolnjajushhih funkcii inostrannogo agenta,
MINISTERSTVO JUSTICII ROSSIJSKOJ FEDERACII, [the Ministry of Justice’s Federal Register of
Information on NGOs Acting as a Foreign Agent], http://unro.minjust.ru/
NKOForeignAgent.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2015) [hereinafter the Register].
133. Russia: Government against Rights Groups, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 23,
2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/15/russia-government-against-rights-groups (“And
the three NGOs which registered voluntarily: Non-commercial Partnership ‘Supporting
Competition in the CIS Countries’ - June 27, 2013, ‘The Union of Young Political Scientists’,
Karachay–Cherkess Republican Youth Social Organization - December 15, 2014, Regional
Social Movement ‘Novgorod Women's Parliament’ (Veliky Novgorod) - March 6, 2015”).
134. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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Soviet—not Russian—prison system.135 The Register also includes,
for example, the Moscow School of Civic Education.136 All but one
organization on the Register, the majority of which are civil advocacy
groups, were added between the middle of 2014 and the beginning of
2015.137 While chief officers at some of the organizations assert that
they are working in the interests of the Russian people, the label
“foreign agent” creates the impression at first glance that they are
working if not against the interests of the Russian State and people,
then at least for the benefit of another State.138 These organizations, of
course, are required to advertise their status as “foreign agent.”139
Beyond registration, federal prosecutors have made use of a
Civil Procedural Code provision granting authority to file suit “in
defense of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens.”140
Using this provision, they have won Foreign Agents cases against six
groups.141 Four of those groups have been ordered to register, while
two were shut down altogether.142 Prosecutors filed based on the
claim that the groups' failures to register as “foreign agents”
threatened public safety.143
Prosecutors have obtained administrative penalties for six civil
society groups due to their failure or refusal to register as “foreign
agents.”144 The organizations fined under the law include the elections
monitoring group Golos and the environmental protection group
Ekozashchita.145 Failure to register creates significant financial
liabilities for both organizations and their directors.146 However, the
135. The Saratov Center for Social Politics and Gender Research, GOLOS, Public
Verdict, and Memorial, respectively. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 8, 18, 129 (demonstrating the mainstream idea in Russian political
rhetoric that civil society and human rights reporting are seen as provocations by non-Russian
powers).
139. Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2, art. 2.4.
140. Grazhdanskii protsessual'nyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GK RF] [Civil
Procedural Code of the Russian Federation] art. 45.1 (Russ.). (“The Prosecutor may apply to a
court for the protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens [or] an
unspecified group of individuals, the interests of the Russian Federation, and the federal
municipal subjects of the Russian Federation.”)
141. Supra note 133 and accompanying text.
142. Id. (The Saint Petersburg LGBT advocacy center Vykhod [Coming Out] and the
Saint Petersburg branch of Memorial).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See generally supra Part I.
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need to register once designated is not guaranteed: at least four
organizations have successfully appealed designations as “foreign
agents.”147
Finally, the directors of six civil society groups have personally
faced administrative liability, though four of them were acquitted.148
Twenty-nine NGOs across Russia had received official notices that
they were in violation of the Foreign Agent Law, while another fiftyfour had received official warnings that, if they plan to engage in
“political activities,” they must register as “foreign agents” in order to
avoid liability.149 These prosecutions are significant in that they
implicate the freedoms of association, expression, and reputation for
the individuals associated with the organizations forced to wear the
label that they are acting in the interests of a non-Russian power.
B. The Dual Citizenship Law
According to major commercial Russian media, some 43,000
Russian nationals were subject to administrative fines for failing to
report second citizenships by the end of 2014—the six-month period
since the passage of the Dual Citizenship Law.150 Though the
potential for liability under this law reaches RUB200,000, the fines in
these cases ranged from RUB500 to RUB1000—about US$8 to
US$16 at the time of writing.151
On December 9, 2014, the first and, so far, sole criminal charges
under the Dual Citizenship Law were filed in the Leningrad
147. Supra note 124 and accompanying text. It is material that three of the successful
groups were tried in the same regional (Perm) court.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Rossijan nachali shtrafovat' za dvojnoe grazhdanstvo, [Russians Start to
Get Fined for Dual Citizenship], PRAVDA, Dec. 5 2014, http://www.pravda.ru/news/
society/05-12-2014/1238722-rossia-0/ (“The Federal Migration Service of Russia reported that
more than 40 thousand Russians were fined for not reporting by October 4, a current second
citizenship”); Za dvojnoe grazhdanstvo v Rossii oshtrafovali bolee 40 tys. Chelovek, [More
Than Forty Thousand People Were Fined For Dual Citizenship in Russia], INTERFAX, Dec. 5,
2014, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/411287 (“More than forty thousand people have been fined
for the fact that they did not report that they had a second citizenship by October 4.”) For
context, the population of Russia (including the recently reincorporated Republic of Crimea) is
about 145,000,000.
151. Id.; Over 40,000 Russians fined for concealing dual citizenship – report, RAPSI
(Dec. 5, 2014) http://rapsinews.com/news/20141205/272717675.html (“Administrative
penalties have been meted out to 43,000 people, who have been fined between 500 and 1,000
rubles”).
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Region.152 According to the Federal Investigative Committee for the
Leningrad Region, the defendant is a Leningrad Region resident who
has held a residence permit in nearby Estonia since 2013.153 The
defendant failed to report his dual residency to Customs upon leaving
Russian territory, and was detained.154 He faces criminal liability up
to RUB200,000, or alternatively, up to 400 hours of compulsory labor
if convicted.155
C. Use of Other Russian Laws of Concern
It is true that the Foreign Agent Law is the most-used of any of
those discussed. Meanwhile, two legislative projects of concern—the
Aggressor State Bill and the Undesirable Organizations Bill—are
awaiting passage in the State Duma. There have not been any
prosecutions under the Rights and Freedoms Law.156
D. Other Thematically Linked Developments
It is not only Russian nationals who face prosecutions in relation
to real or perceived ties to non-Russian powers.157 In August 2014,
Jennifer Gaspar, the American wife of Russian lawyer Ivan Pavlov—
who has represented organizations tried as “foreign agents”—had her
residency revoked based on FSB (Russia’s federal security and
intelligence service) allegations that she had called for the overthrow
of the Russian government and that her presence in the country
152. Pervoe za vtoroe, [First for the Second], GAZETA.RU, Dec. 9, 2014,
http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2014/12/09/6335101.shtml (“The Investigative Committee of the
Leningrad Region has filed the first criminal case for the concealment of a second
citizenship.”); First criminal case filed under Russian law on dual citizenship, RUSSIA
BEYOND
THE
HEADLINES
(Dec.
9,
2014),
http://rbth.com/news/2014/12/09/
first_criminal_case_filed_under_russian_law_on_dual_citizenship_42103.html (“The first
criminal case has been filed under a new law requiring Russians with dual citizenship to
disclose their status to the federal authorities.”) The official press release on the case, which
was available at the end of December 2014, available at http://lenobl.sledcom.ru/
news/detail.php?news=20288, has since been taken down.
153. Id. Customs is handled by the FSB in Russia. Ethnic Russians are treated poorly
(sometimes subjected officially to second-class status) in post-Soviet Baltic (Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania) states due to the fact that the Baltics were forcefully incorporated into the
Soviet Union after the beginning of World War II. For this reason, Russians and others
perceived as having any kind of allegiance to the Baltic States are viewed with suspicion by
Russian law enforcement and others.
154. Id.
155. See Russian Criminal Code, supra note 60, art. 330.2
156. That is, as this Note was submitted for publication.
157. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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constituted a national security threat.158 The case against her was
widely perceived within the Russian legal and human rights
communities as a politically motivated threat to her husband based on
his representation of alleged “foreign agent” organizations.159 The St.
Petersburg City Court, which heard her case, dismissed her challenge
to the revocation on December 18, 2014.160 Mr. Pavlov stated to
media that the couple had planned to appeal the decision, and in
February 2015, a St. Petersburg city court suspended the
investigation.161
E. European Court Article 11 Jurisprudence162
Though the captions of 2014 Article 11 (freedom of association)
decisions adverse to Russia read like a “who’s-who” of prominent
dissidents and opposition members, the majority of the cases deal
with the right to public assembly, not with ideological or professional
association.163 The principles the ECtHR sets out regarding Article
158. Sud priznal amerikanskuju pravozashhitnicu “ugrozhajushhej nacbezopasnosti
RF”, [Court Recognizes Human Rights Advocate as “Threatening the Security of the Russian
Federation”] FILANTROP, Dec. 19, 2014, http://philanthropy.ru/news/2014/12/19/19547/ (“The
St. Petersburg City Court dismissed U.S. citizen Jennifer Gaspar's complaint against the
cancelation of her residence permit. The court followed the FSB and [Federal Migration
Service] in deciding that she poses a threat to Russian security.”); Gaspar proigrala sud FSB,
[Gaspar Loses Case to FSB], LENIZDAT.RU, Dec. 18, 2014, http://lenizdat.ru/articles/1125734/
(“The St. Petersburg City Court dismissed a claim by human rights advocate Jennifer Gaspar
against the regional Federal Security Service (FSB) office, contesting the grounds of the
deprived her of residence and her expulsion from Russia under the pretext of a threat to
national security.”).
159. See correspondences on file with the author.
160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161. See id.; Zhurnal “Fontanka,” Sud priostanovil rassmotrenie iska o sekretnosti
prichin vydvorenija Dzhenifer Gaspar, [Court Suspends Consideration of Claim of Secret
Reasons for Expulsion of Jennifer Gaspar], Feb. 19, 2015, http://www.fontanka.ru/
2015/02/19/131/ (“The City Court has suspended a case in which American Jennifer Gaspar
contested secret documents which were the reason behind the deprivation of her residency.”)
162. The ECtHR’s small body of Article 10 jurisprudence as it relates to Russia deals
overwhelmingly with censorship, so this Note leaves Article 10 complaints out of the
discussion.
See
generally
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/
search.aspx#{"languageisocode":["ENG"],"respondent":["RUS"],"documentcollectionid2":["G
RANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"violation":["10"]} (HUDOC search limiting to
determinations of Russian Article 10 violations).
163. See generally http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"sort":["kpdate
Descending"],"respondent":["RUS"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHA
MBER"],"violation":["11"]} (Navalnyy v. Russia, Nemtsov v. Russia, Kasparov v. Russia).
See also Nemtsov v. Russia, 1744/11 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1, 18, ¶ 79 (2014) (identifying Article 11
violation in restriction on right to “peaceful assembly”).
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11, however, are applicable to such types of association; for example,
in Vogt v. Germany, a landmark Article 11 case, the ECtHR held that
the means of State restriction of or interference with association must
be proportionate to a legitimate State aim.164 That is, where the State
Party’s restriction on Article 11 rights is disproportionate to the stated
aim of the restriction, the ECtHR will find a violation.165
Further, the ECtHR holds that restrictions on or interference with
association must be a necessary method of upholding public order in a
democratic society.166 Specifically, to find a violation of Article 11, it
applies a three-tiered test.167 A restriction of a protected right will
constitute a breach of Article 11 unless the restriction is: (1)
prescribed by law; (2) enacted in pursuance of one or more legitimate
aims under paragraph 2 of the Convention; and (3) is “necessary in a
democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.168
F. ICCPR Articles 17, 19, and 22 at the Human Rights Committee
The Articles of the ICCPR specifically relevant here are 17
(which includes the right to reputation), 19 (freedom of expression),
and 22 (freedom of association).169 It is for that reason that the
Committee, the treaty oversight body of the ICCPR, comes into
play.170 Article 41 of the ICCPR creates the inter-state complaint
mechanism at the Committee, while the First Optional Protocol,
which Russia has ratified, creates recourse for individuals
complaining about human rights abuses by a State Party.171
In contrast to the ECtHR, the Human Rights Committee has
reviewed only a few complaints from Russians regarding violations of
civil and political rights.172 In fact, the Committee has never reviewed
164. Vogt v. Germany, 17851/91 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 68 (1995).
165. Id. (finding that the state-administered school’s decision to fire the complainant was
“disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,” and therefore a violation of Article 11).
166. See, e.g., Alekseyev v. Russia, 4916/07, 25924/08, 14599/09 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1, 16 ¶
69 (2011). Due to the Court’s principle of margin of appreciation, whereby it defers to the
culture and customs of the respondent State, this paper cites European Court case law
regarding Russia wherever possible.
167. Primov v. Russia, 17391/06 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1, 24 ¶ 121 (2014).
168. Id.
169. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
171. ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 41; ICCPR, supra note 96, at Preamble.
172. The Committee has reviewed one Article 19 complaint against Russia. See
Kholodova v. Russian Federation, CCPR/C/106/D/1548/2007 (2011). It has reviewed a total of
47 First Optional Protocol complaints against the Russian Federation (see the list at United
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an Article 22 complaint against the Russian Federation.173 This means
that not only has the Human Rights Committee never viewed a
freedom of expression-related complaint from a Russian national, but
also that no Russian has ever actually filed such a complaint with the
Committee.174 While the Committee has reviewed three Article 17
complaints against Russia, these all have centered on the right to
privacy or family life provisions of that article, and not on the right to
reputation.175
However, the Committee has issued Views as recently as 2014
on the freedoms of association and expression, including in
consideration of complaints by members of NGOs.176 These rulings
were in countries with law enforcement cultures comparable to
Russia’s, and which are in Russia’s immediate neighborhood.177
Samples of all of those decisions are included in this Section’s
discussion, in addition to an unsuccessful Article 17 complaint against
the formerly Soviet state of Tajikistan that provides some procedural
illustration.178
One of the most important cases for the discussion is
Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan. The complainant in Toregozhina is the
head of an NGO that was arrested in her office five days after a rally
in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, in a purportedly preventative
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Acceptance of individual complaints procedures for
Russian Federation, § CCPR-OP1, available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=RUS&Lang=EN).
173. Individual Communications – database on decisions, CENTRE FOR CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, http://www.ccprcentre.org/individual-communications/decisions-search/
?p2p_country_to_decision[]=347&relevant_articles[]=165 (search narrowed to "Russian
Federation" and “Article 22”) (last visited Mar. 24, 2015, 3:18 AM).
174. Individual Communications – database on decisions, CENTRE FOR CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, http://www.ccprcentre.org/individual-communications/decisions-search/
?p2p_country_to_decision[]=347 (listing the Human Rights Committee Views with the
Russian Federation as a party, noting no instances of Article 22 rulings either on the merits or
on procedural grounds).
175. See generally Khakdar v. Russian Federation, CCPR/C/112/D/2126/2011 (2014)
(partially admissible, but no Article 17 violation); V. A. v. Russian Federation,
CCPR/C/105/D/1526/2006 (2012) (inadmissible); Y. D. v. Russian Federation,
CCPR/C/101/D/1521/2006 (2011) (inadmissible).
176. See, e.g., Toregozhina v. Kazakhstan, infra note 177.
177. See, e.g., United Nations Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights
Committee under art. 5, ¶ 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (112th session); Communication No. 2137/2012 [hereinafter Toregozhina v.
Kazakhstan] (2010).
178. M.N. v. Tajikistan, CCPR/C/106/D/1500/2006 (2012).
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measure.179 In deciding the merits of Ms. Toregozhina’s Article 19
complaint, the Committee recognized the argument that though
Kazakhstan had provided a legal basis for restricting Ms.
Toregozhina’s freedom to impart information, the State action was de
facto based on her status as a civil activist.180 Ms. Toregozhina
asserted that Article 19 protects an individual’s right to criticize or
publicly evaluate their national government without having to fear
interference or punishment.181 In finding that Kazakhstan had violated
Ms. Toregozhina’s freedom of expression, the Committee reiterated
its requirement that a State demonstrate that the restrictions it imposes
are the least intrusive possible in proportion to the interest
protected.182 Further, the Committee noted that limitations are not
necessarily appropriate, proportionate, or justified simply by virtue of
being imposed pursuant to and in compliance with domestic law.183
In Nepomnyaschikh v. Belarus, the complainant Vladimir
Nepomnyaschikh was a political activist harassed by police and other
law enforcement—pursuant to domestic law—after he invited others
to attend a rally.184 Mr. Nepomnyaschikh asserted that the Belarusian
law on which he was charged constituted a prima facie violation of
Article 19 of the ICCPR by virtue of its restrictions on the impartation
of information.185 In deciding in Mr. Nepomnyaschikh’s favor, the
Committee again noted a proportionality requirement for restrictions
on the freedom of expression.186 The Committee asserted that State
interference with expression must strictly observe necessity and
proportionality, and must be applied strictly in relation to the
purported State interest on which they are predicated.187 As in other
Views, the Committee stressed its position that freedom of expression
is “essential for any society.”188
179. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 177, ¶ 2.2.
180. Id. ¶ 3.3. Russia’s restrictions on the impartation of, for example, human rights
monitoring information fits this mold.
181. Id.
182. Id. ¶ 7.5.
183. Id.
184. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights concerning Communication No. 2156/2012*, 112th Sess., ¶¶ 2.1-.6 (2014) [hereinafter
Nepomnyaschikh v. Belarus].
185. Id. ¶ 3.2.
186. Id. ¶¶ 9.2-.3.
187. Id. ¶ 9.3.
188. Id.
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Regarding Article 22, the Committee holds that the freedom of
association afforded to individual subjects of a State Party’s
jurisdiction extends to the activities of an association.189 While
organizations and associations may not file complaints to the
Committee, this language indicates that affected individuals may file
complaints in relation to their status as members of associations.190 In
the cited decision, Mikhailovskaya and Volchek v. Belarus, the
complainants were administrators of a legal aid NGO who alleged
State obstruction in the process of registering their organization, in
addition to years of police harassment alleged to have included
physical violence.191 Holding in favor of Ms. Mikhailovskaya and Mr.
Volchek, the Committee emphasized that the State Party must
demonstrate that a given restriction on an association’s operations “is
necessary to avert a real and not only hypothetical threat to national
security or democratic order, that less intrusive measures would be
insufficient to achieve the same purpose, and that the restriction is
proportionate to the interest to be protected.”192
To review, for limitations of the rights protected under both
Articles 19 and 22, the Committee emphasizes the need for a
demonstrable necessity of the restriction, with a view to legitimacy in
principle.193 Committee Views on a State Party’s interference with the
freedoms of expression and association stand in contrast to the
ECtHR’s jurisprudence due to the high level of scrutiny regardless of
legality under the State Party’s domestic law.194 Most notably, the
Committee extends the freedom of association to individuals as a
189. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights concerning Communication No. 1993/2010, 111th Sess., ¶ 7.2 [hereinafter
Mikhailovskaya and Volchek v. Belarus]. This is one of two complaints (of twelve reviewed)
that the Committee found fully admissible and in which it held in favor of the complainants.
190. Id. ¶ 2.3 (“The authors claim that because of their activities, members of the NGO
were subjected to constant harassment.”); id. ¶ 7.2. (“the Committee observes that article 22 of
the Covenant guarantees that everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, and the protection afforded by that article extends to all the activities of an
association.”).
191. Id. ¶ 2.1-.9.
192. Id. ¶ 7.3.
193. Compare Committee Views (noting strict proportionality and necessity requirements
in application, e.g., Nepomnyaschikh v. Belarus), with the European Court’s margin of
appreciation principle, which generally allows the Court to defer to the State Party’s cultural
practices and idiosyncratic legal customs in reviewing otherwise questionable legislation and
law enforcement activity.
194. See, e.g., id.
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function of their membership in targeted organizations, though
individuals are still required to file complaints personally with the
Committee.195
There have been relatively few Committee Views dealing with
right to reputation, which is also referred to as “legal personality.”196
Most Article 17 Committee Views that result in violation
determinations deal with more run-of-the-mill privacy violations.197
Of the eighteen “legal personality” Committee Views invoking
Article 17, none in Russia’s political-geographic region has been
found admissible.198 In M.N. et al. v. Tajikistan, for example, the
authors of the complaint claimed a violation of Article 17 after Tajik
State actors ordered the publication of articles and other materials that
adversely affected their reputation.199 This claim in particular was
found to be inadmissible because the information submitted by the
authors was too general to substantiate assertions that their
reputations were put at risk.200 Indeed, the Committee Views actually
do not refer to any information submitted that would substantiate such
claims.201
G. The First Optional Protocol and Constructive Exhaustion
The European Convention, the Protocol, and the Russian
Federation’s understanding to the Protocol all require that
complainants exhaust domestic remedies before a complaint can be
reviewed.202 However, the Committee views domestic exhaustion
requirements as applicable only to the extent that the remedies

195. See Toregozhina, supra note 177.
196. See Individual Communications – database on decisions, CENTRE FOR CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (last visited Mar. 26, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.ccprcentre.org/
individual-communications/decisions-search/?relevant_articles[]=111&decision_keywords
[]=164.
197. See, e.g., Khaokha Marouf v. Algeria, CCPR/C/110/D/1889/2009 (Mar. 27, 2014)
(failure to conduct an effective and thorough investigation); Faroun v. Algeria,
CCPR/C/109/D/1884/2009 (Nov. 27, 2013) (enforced disappearance).
198. M.N. et al. v. Tajikistan, CCPR/C/106/D/1500/2006 (Oct. 29, 2012); V. A. v.
Russian Federation, CCPR/C/105/D/1526/2006 (Jul. 23, 2012).
199. M.N. et al., supra note 198, ¶ 3.3.
200. Id. ¶ 6.5.
201. Id. ¶¶ 2.1-3.7.
202. European Convention, art. 35.1; Protocol at art. 2 and 5.b, supra note 112; Protocol,
supra note 118.
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necessary are effective and available.203 A claim of constructive
exhaustion would require functionally prohibitive red tape in the
Russian court system, which is not a certainty.204 The Committee may
also review a communication by a complainant who has not
exhausted domestic remedies, where it can be established that the
application of the remedies in question has been unreasonably
prolonged.205
Most importantly for the circumstances of this Note, the
Committee considers situations where the judiciary and the executive
are “not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or
direct the former [as] incompatible with the notion of an independent
and impartial tribunal.”206 Observers of Russian government in the
Putin era characterize the interaction between executive and judiciary
in these terms often enough for the claim to be uncontroversial: for
example, consider sections of legislation discussed that require
prosecutors’ “coordination with the executive.”207 Further, the March
2015 Human Rights Committee review of Russia’s compliance with
the ICCPR noted concern with an entire section entitled
“Independence of the Judiciary.”208 The Committee considers “all
information made available to it by the individual and by the State
Party concerned.”209
To date, applications of the Russian statutes described in Part I
have principally included inspections of well-known international
human rights monitoring groups employing Russian nationals, as well
as prosecutions and other administrative actions against smaller, fully
domestic organizations.210 It has also included the registration of
dozens of civil organizations across the country as “foreign
agents.”211 In St. Petersburg, a US human rights worker married to a
Russian civil advocate was denied residency in Russia, in what some
203. Alfred de Zayas, Petitions before the United Nations Treaty Bodies: Focus on the
Human Rights Committee’s Optional Protocol Procedure 51 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
2009).
204. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (Russian Constitutional Court ruling
regarding the Foreign Agent Law).
205. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
206. Angel Olo Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 468/1991, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (1993).
207. See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text.
209. Protocol, art. 5.1 (emphasis added).
210. See supra notes 131, 133 and accompanying text.
211. See Register, supra note 132.
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advocates have alleged to be an indirect threat to her husband over his
representation of “foreign agent” organizations.212 Meanwhile, tens of
thousands of Russians have been subjected to minor liability after
failing to disclose a second citizenship or other residency document to
Russian federal authorities.213
Though the ECtHR has a strong jurisprudential history with the
freedoms of expression and association, the Committee gives greater
deference to legitimacy and proportionality as legal concepts when
reviewing potential violations of these rights.214 Examining recent
Committee Views regarding political activists and civil society NGOs
in the former Soviet Union, the Committee appears to defer less to
local laws that restrict basic rights.215 But the domestic exhaustion
requirement remains a potential obstacle under the Protocol, and
indeed at any international tribunal in question.216 A demonstration of
constructive exhaustion may be useful if Russian activists decide to
file communications with the Human Rights Committee.217 It would
allow the Committee to review a complaint even if the complainant
has not exhausted domestic remedies, due to obstructive legal
conditions within the State Party.218 A Russian activist or advocate
should expect to be required to show either true domestic exhaustion
or constructive exhaustion when filing a complaint at the
Committee.219
III. RECOURSE FOR RUSSIAN ACTIVISTS AND ADVOCATES
Russian activists are right to challenge the cauldron of legislative
and jurisprudential unwisdom leading to such a hostile civil-political
environment at international legal tribunals including the ECtHR.
Doing so is, at the very least, an exercise in disobedience in the face
of authoritarianism. At most, it is a method of incentivizing Russian
prosecutors to cease the use of the laws in question, given these
tribunals’ ability to turn odious domestic legislation into an
international spectacle. No matter what, it should be uncontroversial
212. See supra notes 158, 161 and accompanying text (regarding Jennifer Gaspar).
213. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
214. See Nepomnyaschikh, supra note 184.
215. See Toregozhina, supra note 177; Nepomnyaschik, supra note 184; Volchek, supra
note 189.
216. See Protocol, supra note 112.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. Id.
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that Russians are able to litigate in jurisdictions to which the Russian
Federation has volunteered.
Even in light of legitimate reservations regarding the uncertain
legal status of Committee Views, Russian nationals may benefit from
filing communications with the Committee as an alternative to the
ECtHR.220 The ICCPR’s triangular protections of association,
expression, and reputation, in conjunction with the Committee’s
jurisdiction over Russia, make that venue the preferable tribunal for
Russian nationals seeking recourse in relation to these laws.221
Additionally, the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation principle may work
against complainants where the point of contention concerns a
national law.222
The relevant Russian statutes, most notably the Foreign Agent
Law, violate ICCPR Articles 17, 19, and 22 facially and in practice.223
The legal culture that follows the enforcement of these statutes is
creating an environment in which civil society NGOs, particularly
those engaged in human rights research and reporting, are in a
constant state of uncertainty about their future while their employees
and associates are subjected to an administrative character
assassination campaign.224 By legally threatening to tarnish the
reputation of organizations and their employees and directors, the
Foreign Agent Law in particular has real implications on freedom of
expression and association.225 Meanwhile, by forcing organizations
working in the interests of Russian civil society to publicly declare
their status as “foreign agents,” the Law creates a legally unjustifiable
obstruction to the exercise of their freedom to impart information.226
In arguing violations of the relevant ICCPR provisions, a
Russian complainant will need to prove individual victim status, and
not that the given NGO has been targeted—even if such targeting has
occurred.227 This could prove difficult, but not insurmountable.228 For
example, restrictions on expression may take substantive or

220. See generally supra Part II.F.
221. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
222. See Handyside, supra note 90.
223. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., supra notes 129 and 131 and accompanying text.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
228. See generally supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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procedural forms affecting the individual NGO director.229 The
Foreign Agent Law may cause the closure of an organization due to
its failure to report its status or to comply with all provisions of the
statute.230 But procedurally, the auditing requirement and the required
documentation regarding personnel and expenses have the potential to
obstruct an organization’s ability to impart information by
unnecessarily forcing it to redirect already scant resources to ensure
compliance.231 In this not unusual scenario, the NGO director would
have the opportunity to argue that her individual right to impart
information has been violated by way of legal obstructions to the
effective operation of her organization.232
Article 17 of the ICCPR provides a good chance of redress for
Russians targeted by these laws.233 It has already been established that
designation as “foreign agent” is roughly equivalent in Russian to
designation as “spy.”234 In this connection it is crucial to note the real
consequences of State designations, legislative or otherwise, of
certain Russian nationals as actors in the interest of insidious nonRussian forces.235 One example is the February 2015 assassination of
right-wing-liberal politician Boris Nemtsov, discussed above.236
Russian “foreign agent” activists and human rights workers would be
well-advised to cite Nemtsov’s treatment by official State media
outlets, and his fate, when complaining to the Committee about State
action designating them as actors in the interests of non-Russian
powers seeking to destabilize Russia.237 Consider also the ECtHR’s
deference to States Parties under the margin of appreciation principle,
and the Committee’s apparent consideration of potential conflicts
between domestic laws and ICCPR obligations—with preference for
the latter.238
Russia’s Understanding of the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, which establishes the individual complaint mechanism
229. Id.
230. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting the Committee’s emphasis
on substantiating claims in comparison to the abundance of information available to Russian
activists in order to do so).
234. See Kramer, supra note 109; Nechepurenko, supra note 109.
235. See generally id.
236. See generally id.
237. See generally id.
238. See Handyside, supra note 90; see Nepomnyaschikh supra note 184.
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advocated here, does not affect its legal status in Russia.239 The only
potential hang-up for Russian activists seeking recourse at the
Committee is the domestic exhaustion requirement contained in both
the Protocol and the Russian Understanding.240 Russians should
therefore take all measures available to them to litigate these issues
within Russian the court system.241 In practice, this amounts to
appealing any adverse decision all the way up to Russia’s
Constitutional Court.242 Should the domestic litigation process be
obstructed by arbitrary delays or other administrative problems,
Russians will have the opportunity to argue constructive exhaustion
before the Committee.243 The Committee has recognized constructive
exhaustion in 2014 cases regarding human rights activists and
advocates in the former Soviet Union.244
It is important to note that individuals alleging victimhood must
personally file communications with the Committee pursuant to the
Protocol.245 However, that requirement, as it relates to the laws in
question, creates two potential benefits. First, most of those
individuals targeted by the Foreign Agent Law are either attorneys or
human rights advocates with intimate understandings of Russia’s
laws, its international legal obligations, and the potential venues of
recourse.246 Second, the law creates a vast pool of potential individual
victims to litigate the issue.247 That is, though it is not possible for
organizations to file communications with the Committee, at least as
alleged victims under the Protocol, it is not necessary given the pool
of staff at the considerable number of human rights NGOs operating
in Russia.248 All of the substantive law and strategic procedural points
here support the individual complaint procedure of the First Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR as a preferable alternative to the European
Court of Human Rights for questions related to the freedoms of
expression, association, and reputation in President Putin’s Russia.
239. See Protocol, supra note 112.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Nepomnyaschikh supra note 186.
245. See Protocol, supra note 112.
246. See Register, supra note 132 (noting the number of public interest and human rights
defense groups listed).
247. Id.
248. Id.

1260 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1219
CONCLUSION
A legislative trend initiated under the third term of Russian
President Vladimir V. Putin, and which claims to target dangerous
foreign interference in Russian society, adversely affects civil
activists and advocates to the point of violating major international
human rights treaties.249 The laws directly or indirectly restrict these
individuals’ abilities to exercise their freedoms of expression and
association, and also implicate their reputations in ways that could put
them in physical danger.250 The UN Human Rights Committee put its
concerns about the ICCPR implications of these laws on the record as
this Note was being submitted for review.251
This Note calls on the Russian legislature, judiciary, and
executive to take steps to bring the country’s legal framework into
compliance with Articles 19, 22, and especially 17 of the ICCPR in
order to facilitate an environment in which civil society groups are
able to operate openly and without fear. As it stands, however,
Russians should complain to the UN Human Rights Committee about
the unjust restrictions on the exercise of their freedoms of association
and expression. Given the provisions of recent statutes purporting to
target insidious foreign interference with Russian society, the
conflation of human rights reporting with such interference, and the
recent assassination of a prominent dissident politician similarly and
explicitly characterized as an enemy of Russia, they have ample
grounds to do so.

249. See generally supra notes 128, 130 and accompanying text.
250. See generally Foreign Agent Law, supra note 2; Rights and Freedoms Law, supra
note 49; Aggressor Bill, supra note 64; Nechepurenko, supra note 109; Yaffa, supra note 111.
251. UN Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of
the Russian Federation, supra note 35.

